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Analyst underreaction to past information about earnings:
reporting, processing or plain old misspecification bias?
Abstract
We revisit the debate concerning the interpretation given to prior year’s earnings changes in
predicting future earnings as discussed by Abarbanell & Bernard (1992), Francis & Philbrick
(1993)  and Easterwood and Nutt (1999). We advance a new specification of this relationship
which distinguishes between earnings reversion and momentum.
On a large UK dataset, we find there is substantial underreaction, particularly in situations of
earnings momentum, approximately six times as large as that identified by Abarbanell &
Bernard. This suggests that analysts behaviour is still a candidate to explain post earnings
announcement drift. We also show that our model performs well relative to a specification
recently proposed by Easterwood and Nutt (1999).
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Analyst underreaction to past information about earnings: reporting, processing or plain
old misspecification bias?
The inability of stock markets to speedily impound recent earnings information is often regarded
as one of the most worrying phenomena for those who believe in the efficient markets
hypothesis (Brennan, 1991, Ball 1992). Evidence of post -earnings announcement drift (PEAD)
exists for the US (Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990, Bernard 1993) and, in small firm portfolios
for the UK (Hew et al, 1996). Fama (1998) in a review, which is dismissive of many supposed
anomalies to the efficient market hypothesis, cites PEAD as an anomaly which is “above
suspicion” (1998, p 304). 
One potential explanation of this phenomenon is analyst’s underreaction to recent changes in
earnings. Analysts may simply underweight recent earnings information, which in turn leads to
Bayesian underrevision of the earnings forecast. When earnings are subsequently announced,
analysts and other market agents take time to adjust. This explanation constitutes a form of
processing bias in the formation of earnings forecasts. 
Overall, research has not found the behaviour of analysts to be a convincing explanation for the
anomaly of PEAD. Abarbanell & Bernard (1992) find that the extent of underreaction of analysts
to prior year earnings change is far too modest to explain observed post-earnings
announcement drift. In a study of Value Line forecasts, Francis & Philbrick (1993) find that
Abarbanell & Bernard’s underreaction coefficient disappears once we control for the tendency
of analysts to boost forecasts for companies which have had sell recommendations issued
against them. Francis & Philbrick argue that the properties of the forecast error are associated
with a reporting bias by analysts, rather than a processing bias in the interpretation of the prior
years earnings change. Furthermore, using a variation on the Abarbanell & Bernard model,
recent evidence by Easterwood and Nutt (1999) suggests that analyst behaviour can be
characterised as generalised optimism rather than under or overreaction. That is, analysts over
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emphasise past rising trends in earnings and underplay past falling trends in earnings.
Given the lack of association of PEAD with any underreaction by analysts, other explanations
for it are now being proffered. For example, Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam (1998)
suggest that the apparent finding of PEAD is part of the long run adjustment of prices to
fundamental values. That is, the announcements after which there appears to be drift are
selective events made to correct,  or take advantage of, the market’s mispricing.
In this paper we suggest that analysts underreaction to prior year earnings changes has been
understated, and therefore there may still be merit in this explanation of PEAD. Specifically, we
argue that the Abarbanell & Bernard test for analysts’ underreaction to prior year earnings is
inadequately specified. We revise the specification of the model by clarifying the nature of
analyst’s underreaction to recent earnings numbers. Our estimates in our revised model show
substantial underreaction; in some situations, our coefficient is eight times as large as that
reported by Abarbanell & Bernard.  Furthermore we show that, contrary to Francis & Philbrick
(1993), analysts’ underreaction is robust to the inclusion of the boosting of forecasts for sell
recommendations. Hence, the reporting bias found by Francis & Philbrick is, both conceptually
and empirically, separable from underreaction to the prior year’s earnings change. This
confirms market recognition of the presence of the two separate phenomena reported in
Francis and Soffer (1997). Our revised specification also compares favourably with the
generalised optimism story of Easterwood and Nutt (1999).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses earlier work
on the topic. We then introduce our suggested respecification of the Abarbanell & Bernard
model and the further insights it offers into analysts interpretation of earnings information. We
also compare our respecification with that advanced by Easterwood and Nutt. The third section
discusses the factors which might be driving the sell recommendation explanation of apparent
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forecast inefficiency, as advanced by Francis & Philbrick. Section four gives details of our
sample frame and data. Section five presents our results and a final section concludes the
paper.
EARLIER RESEARCH
Abarbanell & Bernard
Abarbanell & Bernard (1992), hereinafter A&B, investigate the possibility that the underreaction
of the stock market to earnings information is explained by analysts failure to revise their
forecasts to fully reflect past changes in earnings. They ask the question: “Can analyst
underreaction explain post-earnings announcement drift?” They answer that although analysts
do indeed underreact to past changes in earnings, the extent of that underreaction is far too
modest to explain observed post-earnings announcement drift. 
In order to identify the extent of underreaction to past changes in earnings, they use the
following variables to estimate equation (1).
Et = annual earnings per share for period t
Ft = forecast of annual earnings per share for period t
PYEC = prior year earnings change at the time the forecast is made. 
=  Et-1 - Et-2
Et - Ft = a + b.PYEC + ut (1)
where ut ~ N(0,su)
If Ft is an efficient forecast, then b will be zero. Therefore, non zero values of b mean that
information, which is available at the time of the forecast, is not being used to reduce the
forecast error. Analysts fail to spot a systematic error in their forecasts. In addition to the
concern about inefficiency, A&B make a second interpretation of their findings. This is that the
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sign of the coefficient b has implications for the way in which analysts process information. They
suggest that a finding of b > 0 indicates underreaction, whilst a finding of b < 0 indicates
overreaction to the prior year earnings change. Using Value Line forecasts for 178 firms over
the period 1976-1986, they find underreaction to the prior year earnings change. Their estimate
of b is 0.08, which is significantly different  from  zero, for forecasts made before the 1st quarter
report. Forecasts made after the 3rd, but before the 4th quarter, also suffer from underreaction,
but less so;  b is still significant, but smaller, at 0.03.
Francis & Philbrick
Francis & Philbrick (1993), hereinafter F&P, offer a somewhat different interpretation of the
process by which Value Line analysts appear to underreact to past changes in earnings. These
authors suggest a reporting explanation rather than a processing explanation for the upward
bias in analysts’ forecasts. They shift the focus from past changes in earnings to switches in
stock recommendation as a driver of earnings forecast revisions. Their explanation is linked to
the A&B suggestion that the finding of underreaction is largely associated with poor recent
performance (that is with negative values of the prior year earnings change).
F&P note that the Value Line analysts who prepare forecasts do not make stock
recommendations. Value Line’s stock selection strategy is undertaken by a separate group
within the organisation. When a company faces difficult times and a sell recommendation is
prepared by the Value Line stock selection group, analysts who make forecasts face a dilemma.
They must trade off their reputation with investors against their relationship with the managers
of the corporations they follow. Although investors pay their wages in the form of fees for
investment advice, it is the managers of the companies that keep analysts in business by
providing them with insights into the company’s life. A perfectly accurate forecast, consistent
with the sell recommendation, would give the analyst a great reputation amongst investors for
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one time-period, but would probably be punished by reduced access to management in every
subsequent period. So current accuracy and future accuracy  (which is a function of degree of
access to corporate management) must be traded off1 in a manner suggested by Figure 1
below. This trade-off is the source of reporting bias in the forecast of earnings issued by
analysts.
Figure 1 about here
In order to test their ideas, F&P add another variable, the stock recommendation (REC), to the
A&B underreaction equation, as follows, 
REC = -1 if sell
= 0 if hold
= 1 if buy
and estimate equation (2).
Et - Ft = a + b.PYEC + q.REC + vt (2)
where vt ~ N(0,sv)
They find that b is 0.0755 and significant when PYEC is the only variable; this is very similar to
A&B’s result. However, when REC is added, q is positive and significant, but b is not. Their
results support the suggestion that sell recommendations (negative REC values) are associated
with an increased upward bias in earnings forecasts. They find that when issuing sell
recommendations, analyst’s forecasts are biassed upwards by about 12 %, whereas when a
buy recommendation is issued the resulting bias is only 3%. They interpret their finding to imply
a form of reporting bias, in the sense that the analyst correctly infers future earnings but fails
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to report it. Note that the F&P claim, that the recommendation effect “explains” perceived
analyst underreaction to PYEC, may be interpreted as standing in tension with the later finding
of Francis and Soffer (1997) that investors price both the recommendation made by analysts
and their forecasts individually.
Easterwood and Nutt
Recently Easterwood and Nutt (1999), hereinafter E&N, have advanced a possible
reconciliation between reported underreaction and De Bondt and Thaler’s (1990) generalised
overreaction. E&N allow the  response coefficient of analysts to a prior year earnings change
to vary with different past states of nature, namely the level of PYEC. This allows for the
possibility of underreaction and overreaction within the same equation, as follows.
Et - Ft = a0 + a1 Low + a2 High + a3 PYEC + a4 (PYEC. Low) + a5 (PYEC. High) + ut (3)
where 
Low = 1, if the firm’s prior year earnings change is in the lowest quartile of their sample
= 0, otherwise
High = 1, if the firm’s prior year earnings change is in the highest quartile of their
sample
= 0, otherwise
and ut ~ N(0,su)
E&N find that when PYEC has a low value, then the coefficient on PYEC is positive and
therefore analysts underreact. However, if PYEC has a high value then the coefficient on PYEC
is negative and therefore analysts overreact. They therefore suggest that analysts’ behaviour
is  characterised as “generalised optimism”, rather than under or overreaction. That is, analysts
overemphasise past rising trends in earnings and underplay past falling trends in earnings.
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MODELLING UNDER/OVERREACTION TO PRIOR YEAR EARNINGS
CHANGE
The rationale which A&B give for their underreaction/overreaction test in equation (1) above is
very brief (1992, p1201). At first sight, the interpretation of the equation seems straight forward.
However, the interpretation of b > 0 as underreaction makes sense only when earnings are
trending; when the earnings process is reverting to a past value, then b > 0 implies
overreaction! What A&B report is a response coefficient which averages across these two
states. This is discussed in more detail below and illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2 about here
Consider the case of b > 0, which A&B interpret as underreaction. When earnings are rising
(PYEC > 0), equation (1) specifies the forecast error (Et - Ft) as positive
2. The underreaction
explanation is that analysts are too cautious about current earnings (Et) rising further and
therefore the forecast tends to be systematically below the realisation of Et. Too little weight is
given to PYEC in the construction of Ft, resulting in pessimistic forecasts. This situation is
illustrated in the top part of Figure 2.
Similarly, when earnings are falling (PYEC < 0), a value of b > 0 means that the forecast error
(Et - Ft) is negative. Analysts are interpreted as being too reticent to believe that current
earnings (Et) will keep on falling. Consequently, too little weight is given to the negative PYEC
in the construction of Ft, which results in the forecast being systematically larger than the
realisation of Et, resulting in optimistic forecasts.
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This story is fine as far as it goes, and makes sense in the situation where the PYEC contains
information confirming a continuation of the current trend of earnings. But what if earnings
revert to a past value3 and the information in the positive PYEC relates to the future decline of
Et. What interpretation can be given to b > 0 in equation (1) in this scenario? This is important
because  Fama & French (2000) show that reversion is the more likely case.  Somewhat
surprisingly, the correct interpretation to b > 0 is that analysts, in fact, overreact to the
information contained in PYEC and exaggerate the decline in earnings. This is explained below.
When a positive PYEC contains information about earnings reversion (for example, when
earnings are rising, but at a sharply falling rate), if there is underreaction then we would expect
the forecast to lag behind the actual reversion in earnings. This would mean that forecasted
change in earnings (Ft - Et-1) will be negative but smaller in absolute size than the actual change
(Et - Et-1). The forecast error (Et - Ft) will be negative since the forecast will exceed the outcome.
This case is illustrated by the lower part of Figure 2. However, this outcome is not correctly
modelled by a positive b in equation (1). When b and PYEC are positive, then equation (1)
specifies that the forecast error (Et - Ft) will also be positive. In order for equation (1) to model
underreaction correctly in the case where earnings revert, b must be negative.
The A&B equation (equation 1 in our paper) is, in reality, a test of whether analysts (a)
underreact in cases where earnings trend and (b) overreact when earnings are reverting. The
A&B equation specifies that the sign of the forecast error will change with the sign of PYEC.
However, the sign of the forecast error should also change with the information that is contained
in PYEC, that is with the nature of the underlying earnings process. When PYEC > 0,
underreaction to the PYEC should lead to Ft < Et when earnings are trending, but to Ft > Et
when earnings revert. The interpretation of underreaction to the A&B finding of b > 0 is justified
only if earnings follow a trend.
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This criticism also applies to the E&N specification who estimate the A&B equation, but allow
the b coefficient on the prior year earnings change to vary across different past states of nature:
low, moderate and high levels of prior year earnings change. They find that for low levels of
PYEC, b > 0 which is interpreted as underreaction; and b < 0 for high levels of PYEC which is
interpreted as overreaction. Both of these interpretations rely on the assumption that earnings
follow a trend.
More generally, the A&B and the E&N equations do not indicate how reported underreaction
is related to investors’ misunderstanding about the time series properties of the prior year
earnings change. Other studies have included this relationship in their analysis. For example,
in Bernard and Thomas (1990) underreaction is driven by investors assuming that quarterly
earnings follow a seasonal random walk when there is, in fact, an autocorrelation structure
within the 4 quarters over which earnings are reported. Conversely, in Barberis, et al (1998),
investors underreact because they believe that annual earnings are mean reverting when in fact
the process is a random walk. Our approach is to follow the logic of these previous studies and
explore what interpretations, or misinterpretations, investors are hypothesized to make about
the information contained in the prior values of earnings. The earnings change may pass a
signal to investors of either a continued rise or fall in earnings (momentum), or an imminent
reversal of fortunes (reversion). The prior year earnings change may therefore have varying
implications for future earnings that are not captured by the A&B and E&N equations.
Based on our discussion above, we interpret underreaction as giving b > 0 in cases where
earnings are trending and as giving b < 0 in cases of earnings reversion. For example, if PYEC
is negative but earnings display some form of reversion, then underreaction to this information
will mean that the forecasted rise in earnings (Ft - Et-1) will in fact be smaller than the actual
change (Et - Et-1). The forecast error will be positive (Et > Ft).
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In order to make these distinctions operational, we define the earnings trend regime to be that
in which the direction of movement between t-2 and t-1 continues in the next period. The
reversion regime is defined to be that in which the movement between t-2 and t-1 does not
continue. This is a simple approximation which uses ex post outcomes as a proxy for ex ante
expectations, as implied by rational expectations. When earnings are reverting and the PYEC
> 0, we would expect more outcomes of Et to be below Et-1 than to be above it. Similarly, when
earnings are trending and the PYEC > 0 we would expect more outcomes of Et to be above Et-1
than to be below it. Imbuing analysts with some knowledge of future earnings outcomes seems
reasonable in the light of evidence that analysts can beat simple time series benchmarks.
One approach to adjusting equation (1) for trending and reversion is to simply allow the sign of
the prior year earnings change variable to alter with the earnings process, as follows.
Et - Ft = a + b.PYEC* + ut
where
PYEC* = (+1). PYEC, if earnings trend
= (-1). PYEC, if earnings revert to a past value
This would allow the sign of b (but not its size) to vary with the assumed earnings process. 
Barberis et. al.(1998) suggest that the trending of earnings is thought by investors to be less
common than mean reversion. This accords with the intuition that every tide must turn.
Therefore the degree of underreaction by analysts might vary with the earnings process. In
order to accommodate this, we allow for both the sign and the size of the coefficient b to vary
with the earnings process as follows.
We define
CYEC = current year earnings change = Et - Et-1
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and introduce two dummy variables, PYECR and PYECM. PYECR captures the case of earnings
reversion, where PYEC and CYEC have the opposite sign. PYECM captures the case of
earnings momentum, where PYEC and CYEC have the same sign. The revised A&B
underreaction/overreaction model is then re-written in this decomposed form as follows.
Et - Ft = a + b0 PYECR + b1 PYECM + ut (4)
where 
PYECR = PYEC(prior year earnings change) if
PYEC > 0 and CYEC < 0 or
PYEC < 0 and CYEC > 0
= 0 otherwise
PYECM = PYEC (prior year earnings change) if
PYEC > 0 and CYEC > 0, or 
PYEC < 0 and CYEC < 0
= 0 otherwise
All this model does is to allow the underreaction/overreaction coefficient to be estimated
separately for cases of earnings reversion and earnings momentum. If the A&B model in
equation (1) is an adequate specification, then b0 should not be significantly different from b1
in equation (4). However, if the misspecifation concerns raised above are justified, then we
would expect that underreaction will give b0 < 0 (since analysts will underestimate the reversion
in earnings) and b1 > 0 (since analysts will underestimate the trend in earnings). Also the
absolute value of b1 is likely to be larger than the absolute value of b0; if earnings reversions
are thought to be more widespread than earnings trends, then analysts may underreact more
when earnings trend than when they revert.
A further refinement of the A&B equation, which we explore, distinguishes between momentum
upwards and momentum downwards, as in equation (5). 
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Et - Ft = a + b0 PYECR + b1 PYECM_UP + b2 PYECM_DN + ut (5)
where
PYECM_UP = PYEC for cases of momentum upwards, when CYEC and PYEC have
the same sign and are positive
= 0 otherwise
PYECM_DN = PYEC for cases of momentum downwards, when CYEC and PYEC have
the same sign and are negative
= 0 otherwise
The background to this is twofold. Firstly,  A&B suggest (1992, p1202) that their underreaction
results were strongly linked to optimistic forecasts following weak earnings performance.
Secondly, E&N find evidence of an asymmetric response of forecasts to good and bad news
about PYEC. We model this in the equation by defining poor earnings performance to occur
where both the prior year and the current year earnings changes are negative. 
One aspect of our specification which warrants further discussion is its apparent susceptibility
to look-ahead bias. The b coefficients in equation (4) vary according to the sign of the current
year earnings change which is not known at the time of the forecast. This needs to be
discussed in the context of the trading rule inefficiency and underreaction interpretations which
are placed on the A&B results.
What sort of trading rule is implied by our model ? One rule is that if investors had knowledge
of the current year earnings change (CYEC), the forecast error could be reduced. This is likely
since previous research (for example, Brown & Rozeff 1978 and Brown 1996) shows that
analysts have some knowledge about the sign of next year’s earnings change, beating a wide
range of benchmarks. This is hardly surprising given their access to extensive information
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concerning future corporate performance. Furthermore, for many companies the length of the
production run implies that costs and revenues are known for several months in advance.
We argue above that interpreting the A&B results as underreaction assumes that earnings
follow a trend. If mean reversion in earnings is perceived to be more common (Barberis et al,
1998 and Fama & French, 2000), a more plausible interpretation of the A&B results is, in fact,
overreaction. However, earnings are probably not characterised by a single process. Therefore,
in order to advance the underreaction/overreaction debate, it is necessary to identify the
information about current earnings which is contained in PYEC, and decompose the response
coefficient accordingly. In this paper, we use ex post outcomes as a proxy for the underlying
process upon which analysts base their expectations when making forecasts.
THE SELL RECOMMENDATION EFFECT
In this section, we explore potential explanations for the recommendation effect.  This effect
arises from the alleged additional boost to forecast optimism for firms subject to a sell
recommendation.
The managerial relations hypothesis
The F&P results, which suggest a reporting bias explanation for the sell recommendation effect,
arose in the Value Line setting. Here, stock recommendation is taken as given by the analyst
who issues the earnings forecast. However, it is possible that the reporting bias may also apply
to settings in which the analyst prepares both the recommendation and the forecast.
As in the F & P context, the analyst seeks to maintain good relations with both investors and
the company then he, or she, will need to identify how to use the forecast and the
recommendation to communicate with both parties. Given that stocks are traded on a daily
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basis, any bias in the recommendation is likely to be uncovered relatively quickly. Furthermore,
since the recommendation can take only a restricted set of values (typically, sell, hold or buy)
there is little possibility of fine tuning. Therefore there would seem to be little scope for using
an enhanced recommendation in order to maintain good relations with management. 
In contrast, any bias in the forecast will not be fully apparent until the earnings are announced,
and therefore the forecast is a more suitable instrument for maintaining managerial relations.
Furthermore, the earnings forecast can be adjusted by relatively small amounts in order to fit
the case. These arguments are  valid for both the specific Value Line context and the more
usual setting in which the same analyst issues both a recommendation and a forecast for the
same firm.  Therefore in order to investigate this in our sample we add the recommendation of
the analyst, REC, as an explanatory variable to our equations (4) and (5).
One question which needs to be addressed is how the incremental optimism associated with
sell recommendations  actually helps the analyst’s relationship with the company. Degeorge et
al, 1999 reports evidence of earnings management towards the consensus earnings forecast.
Therefore, surely, more optimistic forecasts are more difficult for the management of the
company to meet? Failure to do so may result in a negative “earnings surprise” and a
consequent increase in the firm’s equity cost of capital. This issue is investigated by Eames,
Glover & Kennedy (1999).
A possible explanation for maintaining the forecast, despite the downgrade of the
recommendation, is that company management may itself wish to control the release of bad
news to the market (Skinner,1994 and Gibbins et al, 1990). Thus may be seen as part of
maintaining trust with outside stakeholders in the firm, particularly fund managers with whom
senior managers regularly meet. Holland (1998) in a case study investigation of investor-
management relations states that corporate managers regard speaking with “one voice” to key
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fund manager/analysts as being central to disseminating an accurate picture of the
corporation’s performance. Barker (1998) also emphasises direct contact between fund
managers and corporate management, as a source of “raw” information as opposed to
receiving information which has been “processed” by analysts. Consequently, fund managers
may prefer to receive earnings information associated with an investment recommendation
downgrade within the context of a broader information set which is best provided by company
management.
The processing bias alternative to the managerial relations hypothesis
In contrast to the managerial hypothesis, the incremental optimism associated with sell
recommendations may reflect the differing cognitive processes invoked when issuing a forecast,
as opposed to revising a stock recommendation. One notable difference between the forecast
and recommendation decision is in the speed with which feedback is made available to the
analyst on his or her decision.  Specifically, the change in the recommendation to sell may
result  in a forecast that lags behind the recommendation because the forecast suffers from a
relatively sluggish  feedback.
Analyst stock-recommendations are met with swift feedback from the market in the form of
subsequent price movements. Price rises following a sell, or price falls following a buy, are likely
to result in swift censure for an analyst. In contrast, a forecast of earnings is only exposed to
the market test several months after the forecast has been made.
Appropriate and timely feedback  has a well established role in encouraging improvement in
forecasting ability. Murphy & Winkler (1984) interpret the good calibration of probability
(confidence-interval) forecasts of weather forecasters in the US National Weather Service as
reflecting the efficacy of good and frequent feedback. Similarly, Albert & Raiffa (1982) report
that the provision of feedback to a Harvard MBA class between one round of probability
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forecasts and another 4 produced marked improvements in the class’s second round forecasts.
In reviewing the literature on the calibration of probabilities Lichtenstein et al  (1982, pp. 327)
list  a number of  studies documenting the ability of feedback to make more realistic the degree
of confidence agents have in their forecasts.
We attempt to discriminate between these processing and reporting bias explanations by
decomposing the recommendation effect into that for affiliated broker firms and unrelated non-
broker firms. Lin & McNichols (1998), Dugar and Nathan (1995) and Michaely and Womack
(1999) investigate the forecasts and recommendations of analysts for which their employer is
acting as broker or is affiliated, that is undertaking IPOs, seasoned offerings and giving advice
on mergers & acquisitions.
Exactly how analysts will trade off their reputation with investors against their relationship with
company managers will depend on their preferences, and the relative shadow prices of these
two goods. In particular, we expect the benefit of good relations with management to be
particularly high for firms for which the analyst’s organisation is a broker. If the relationship with
corporate management is too ruffled they may look elsewhere for advice on mergers and
acquisitions, issuing equity, and other matters. 
This means that we can discriminate between the managerial relations and the processing bias
rationalisations. If the reporting/managerial relations explanation is accurate, then we would
expect optimism to increase when the analyst’s employer acts as broker to the company. If the
processing alternative is correct, then the broker variable will make little difference to the size
of the sell recommendation effect.
The earnings bath hypothesis
But what if the earnings analysts seek to predict are themselves a moving target? Abarbanell
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& Lehavy (1999) argue that the upward bias in the forecast error for sell recommendations
reported by F&P is driven by an adjustment in earnings, rather than in the forecast. Abarbanell
& Lehavy document convincing evidence of earnings manipulation by corporate management
with respect to market perceptions of the firm’s performance, as embedded in the average
outstanding stock recommendation for the firm. Specifically, firms attracting sell
recommendations display an unusually high incidence of “earnings baths”, with large negative
discretionary accruals being shifted into the current year. This earnings management by
company managers results in strong optimism  bias in forecasts for firms  with outstanding sell
recommendations. Analysts forecasts are accurate when issued, but subsequent earnings
management makes them appear optimistic.
Other research suggests that the determination of announced earnings and analysts
expectation of it may be jointly determined. Degeorge et al  (1999) finds that managers of firms
will smooth earnings towards is the consensus analyst forecast. Myers and Skinner (1999)
focus on firms with earnings processes which exhibit momentum. They report strong evidence
of earnings management designed to prolong runs of earnings increases. 
This hypothesis constitutes an important alternative rationalisation of any apparent
recommendation effect. Therefore, we investigate the distribution of actual earnings changes
around recommendation switches, in order to clarify the interpretation of our tests.
DATA & VARIABLES EMPLOYED
The data selected are taken from the published monthly UK equity working lists of a major
investment bank, covering approximately 500 UK companies quoted on London Stock
Exchange, for the period January 1990 to December 1995 inclusive. The lists give the day on
which the information was downloaded from the in-house database and published in the equity
Page 19
working lists. Hence we believe the data to be more timely than forecasts from other frequently
used sources.
Another advantage of this database is actual earnings are measured on the same basis as the
forecast. Analysts do not always forecast the announced earnings per share, but their adjusted
version of it, because they believe that the adjusted version more accurately represents the
performance of the company.
In addition to forecasts and realisations of earnings, the lists give the monthly stock
recommendations (buy, hold or sell) for each company. Therefore our data provides an
important opportunity to examine the F&P Value Line sell recommendation effect outside of the
specific institutional context in which it was first reported. Our setting is the more usual one, in
which the same analyst issues both a recommendation and a forecast for the same firm. A
further attraction of our dataset is the classification of companies by whether or not the
investment bank acts as their broker. We exploit this feature to distinguish between competing
explanations of the sell recommendation effect reported by F&P.
The companies selected for the sample were those which were followed in each of the monthly
lists and this selection procedure yielded a balanced panel sample of 420 companies. The
industry groupings (devised by the investment bank) of the 420 companies are given in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
The variables used in the study are as follows:
Page 20
Ft = forecast of earnings per share, scaled by share price at the date of the forecast
Et = earnings per share, scaled by share price at the date of the forecast
REC = analyst recommendation at the time of the forecast. The values taken are: Buy
(2), Hold (1), Sell (0)
PYEC = prior year earnings change scaled by the share price at the date the forecast is
issued.  
When the forecast, Ft, is made after the announcement of annual earnings per
share at t-1, then PYEC = Et-1 - Et-2
When the forecast, Ft, is made before the announcement of annual earnings per
share at t-1, but after the announcement of annual earnings per share at t-2,
then PYEC = Et-2 - Et-3
CYEC = current year earnings change =  Et - Et-1
PYECM = PYEC for cases of momentum, when CYEC and PYEC have the same
sign
= 0 otherwise
PYECM_UP = PYEC for cases of momentum upwards, when CYEC and PYEC have
the same sign and are positive
= 0 otherwise
PYECM_DN = PYEC for cases of momentum downwards, when CYEC and PYEC have
the same sign and are negative
= 0 otherwise
PYECR = PYEC for cases of reversion, when CYEC and PYEC have the opposite
sign
= 0 otherwise
All studies using analysts forecasts of earnings have to confront the problem of outliers in the
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dataset. Without correction for the effects of outliers the results of our study might display
considerable bias. In the present study we simply follow the procedure suggested by Bernard
and Thomas (1990, pp 311) and A&B (1992, pp 1186) and ”winsorize” our data. This procedure
sets values of past earnings changes and forecast errors (where both are scaled by the current
stock price) which are more than three standard deviations from their respective means to their
mean value plus, or minus three standard deviations.
Figure 3 about here
Central to our alternative decomposition of the A&B equation are the relative frequency and
intensity of momentum and reversion regimes. This results from the relative values of the
current and prior years earnings changes.  We summarise the transition of earnings between
time t-2 and time t in Figure 3. Note that both increases and decreases in prior year earnings
changes are equally likely (54.99% and 45.01% respectively), as are reversion and momentum
regimes (47.9% and 52.1% respectively). Figure 3 shows one outlier for current years earnings
change of -31.5. This observation is classified as part of the momentum regime; however, it is
the value of the prior years earnings change which is included in our tests, not the value of the
current years earnings change.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Benchmarking: the Abarbanell & Bernard and Francis & Philbrick models
In order to see if our sample is comparable with previous studies, we estimate the parameters
of the original A&B model (equation 1) which are given in Table 2. They are practically identical
to A&B’s (1992, page 1202)  results. The constant is negative and significant, and the R2 is
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0.01. More importantly, the coefficient on prior year earnings change (PYEC) is significant and
has a value of 0.08 which is the exactly same as A&B’s result for forecasts made before the first
quarter’s results5. 
Table 2 about here
Table 2 also gives our estimates of the F&P model (equation 2) 6. Our results are very similar
to those of F&P. The constant is negative, implying that forecasts are optimistic on the whole.
More importantly, the coefficient on REC (the recommendation) is positive and significant.
However, in our sample, the value is 0.0064 whereas in F&P it is 0.1192. This may be explained
by our scaling of the forecast error and PYEC by price.
This result supports our contention that the recommendation effect may not be restricted to the
Value Line environment in which the analysts, who prepare forecasts, do not make stock
recommendations. Hence the recommendation effect reported by F & P may extend beyond
the specific institutional context in which it was originally reported. An important aspect of our
results is that the recommendation effect does not eliminate apparent underreaction. In the UK
at least, it appears that analysts underreact to the prior year earnings change and increase their
forecast when downgrading the recommendation. 
Underreaction in earnings momentum and reversion regimes
Table 3 shows the effect of distinguishing between earnings momentum and earnings
reversion, as we suggest above in equations (4) and (5) above. The improved fit of the revised
model is captured by the significant rise in the adjusted R2, from 1% for A&B’s original model
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in Table 2 to 15% or more in Table 3.
Table 3 about here
Result 1 in Table 3 shows that when the coefficient on PYEC is allowed to vary with the
earnings process, it is positive for momentum cases and negative for reversion cases.7 As we
suggest above, this indicates underreaction in both regimes. For example, when the prior year’s
earnings change is positive, this means that the forecast is smaller than realised earnings for
momentum cases. Similarly, where earnings revert, the forecast is larger than realised
earnings. These results suggest generalised underreaction, as opposed to the generalised
optimism reported by Easterwood and Nutt.
Another  important feature of Result 1 in Table 3 is that in the momentum regime the
underreaction is now significantly larger, compared with the A&B benchmark results in Table 2.
The value of the coefficient on PYECM is 0.50 compared with 0.08 for PYEC  reported in Table
2. In contrast, the coefficient for the reversion regime (PYECR) is -0.12 and indicates a degree
of underreaction which is not significantly different from that found in Table 2. Overall therefore,
the underreaction for cases of momentum is much larger than that for cases of reversion
suggesting that investors regard apparent trends as inherently transitory, relative to reversion.
The results are consistent with the assumption made in Barberis et al, (1998) that earnings
reversion is thought by investors to be a more likely state of nature than earnings trending.
Furthermore, investors may be correct in believing earnings reversion to be the more common
state in light of recent evidence reported by Fama and French (2000).
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This suggests that A&B’s conclusion, that analysts’ behaviour is at best only a partial
explanation of stock price underreaction, may be premature. For a subset of firms (where
earnings follow a trend), the underreaction may, in fact, be large enough to explain reported
post earnings announcement drift.
In the second result of Table 3, we also distinguish between momentum upwards and
momentum downwards, as in equation (5). As mentioned earlier, the background to this is that
A&B suggest (1992, p1202) that their underreaction results are strongly linked to optimistic
forecasts following weak earnings performance. Given that we find strong underreaction in the
momentum regime, we investigate whether this too is related to optimism in the context of poor
earnings performance. Here, poor earnings performance is defined to be where both the prior
year and the current year earnings changes are negative. 
Result 2 in Table 3 shows that the coefficient on momentum downwards is 0.67 and significant.
In contrast, the coefficient on momentum upwards is 0.17, very similar to that for the reversion
regime in absolute value . This is suggests that optimism in the face of poor earnings
performance does play an important role in the interpretation of our results. Analysts exhibit
generalised underreaction to PYEC; however, when PYEC is negative, they seem to be
surprised when earnings decline further. This is understandable given the prevalence of
reversion in the aggregate economy. Here our results parallel those already reported by A&B.
A final test in Table 3 (results 3 & 4) is to check whether the recommendation variable
eliminates the underreaction as in F&P. Therefore, we estimate equations (4) & (5) with the
addition of the recommendation variable, REC. The recommendation effect is significant, as
with the results in Table 2, and does not eliminate the underreaction of forecasts. However, the
size of the coefficient is now about half the value  in Table 2.
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The relationship with Easterwood and Nutt
We begin by a direct replication of the E & N specification. The results are given in Table 4 and
show some quantitative differences in the reported coefficients. E&N’s original estimates use
OLS standard errors, and our replication of this is reported in result 1. The qualitative
interpretation of our results is similar to those of E&N, yielding a positive but insignificant
response to prior year earnings change in the base (normal) case8 and a significant negative
shift for high values of PYEC. Unlike E&N, we do not find a positive shift in the coefficient for
low values of PYEC.
However, our data strongly rejects the assumption of homoscedasticity and our preferred
specification uses the White (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity, reported in result 2 of
Table 4.  This shows that analysts overreact to high values of PYEC and underreact in other
cases, which gives support for E&N’s decomposition.
Table 4 about here
Table 5 about here
In order to try and distinguish between E&N’s model and our own, Table 5 reports a Davidson
and MacKinnon (1981) J-test9. The version of our model used is equation (5), in which we
decompose earnings momentum in to that for continuing rises and falls in earnings, PYECM_UP
and PYECM_DN. Intuitively the Davidson and MacKinnon test compares two models by importing
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the predicted values of one specification into the other, even though the two alternatives are not
nested. If one specification dominates the other we would expect the coefficient on the
predicted values from the “true” model to be equal to one and the remaining coefficients in the
regression to be equal to zero. The “false” model’s predicted values would carry a coefficient
of zero, with all remaining coefficients being left unaffected in the reported regression. 
To undertake these tests, we import the predicted values of the E & N specification (denoted
PEN) into our revised model and, conversely, we import the predicted values of our own model
(denoted P) into the E & N specification. As is evident from Table 5, our findings lie somewhere
between the two possible extreme outcomes. 
We suggest that the results tend to favour our revised specification over the E & N
decomposition. When the predicted values of our revised decomposition are inserted into E &
N equation, the reported coefficient is very close to one and strongly significant from zero.
However, none of the E&N PYEC variables remain significant. Reversing the process (to
include E&N’s predicted values in our own specification) the predicted values of their model
carry a coefficient which is smaller than 1, but not significantly so. But all the coefficients of our
model remain highly significant.
Sell recommendations and the broker effect
In this section, we try to discriminate between some of the possible explanations for the sell
recommendation effect, discussed in section I, and found in our sample. This effect consists
of a systematic decrease in the forecast error (Et - Ft) when a sell recommendation is issued
by the analyst. 
One possibility, described by Abarbanell and Lehavy (1999) and discussed above, is that it
reflects a strategic “earnings bath” taken by company management;  that is, sell
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recommendations are associated with a decline in reported (but not true) earnings. Figure 4
shows the path of earnings-per-share for 161 firm/years when companies were downgraded
from hold to sell by the merchant bank. We find no evidence of the earnings bath as discussed
above. Indeed earnings rise in the first year after the switch, for both the average and median
firm, only to begin falling in the following year. 
 
Figure 4 about here
Other explanations for the sell recommendation effect are concerned with the way analysts
construct or report their forecasts. In this section, we exploit the presence of information
concerning whether the analysts’ merchant bank acts as broker to the company in order to
distinguish between competing explanations. If the bias arises during the construction of the
forecast (a processing bias), then the recommendation effect is unlikely to vary between broker
and non broker companies. However, if the bias results from a failure to reveal a “true” forecast
(a reporting bias), then it is likely that the recommendation effect will be larger for companies
for whom the analyst’s merchant bank acts as a broker. This is because analysts have greater
incentives to retain good relations with the incumbent managers of the companies.
Table 6 analyses our sample according to whether the recommendation is buy-hold-sell and
whether or not the analysts organisation acts as broker to the company. Only 0.57% (0.11% ÷
19.23%) of recommendations issued by broker analysts  are sell, compared 11.83% (9.56% ÷
80.77%) for non broker analysts. We conclude that sell recommendations are far less likely to
be issued by the broker analysts in our sample. Hence it is hard to distinguish between the
strength of the sell recommendation effect as evinced by broker and non-broker firms. Firms
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for which the merchant bank acts as broker simply do not attract sell recommendations. This
represents much stronger evidence of a form of reporting bias than merely shading up the
forecast after issuing a sell recommendation.
Table 6 about here
Our tests of equation (5) with the addition of the recommendation variable (REC) are given in
Table 7. For comparison with previous tables, the first result is for the full sample, and is
repeated from Table 3. The second result is for the sub-sample which records information about
broker status. Results 3 and 4 give non broker and broker results respectively. The equation
in the second panel estimates the model for brokers and non brokers, but uses dummy
variables to show whether any changes in the coefficients for broker companies are significant.
Table 7 about here
Although the coefficient on REC is larger for brokers (result 4) than for non brokers (result 3)
the lower panel indicates that the difference is not significant. This might suggest a processing
bias explanation for the recommendation effect. However, Table 6 indicates that analysts hardly
ever issue a sell recommendation when the bank is acting as broker.  So the estimated
coefficients in result 4 and the lower panel simply obscure the underlying reluctance of broker
analysts to issue a sell recommendation in any circumstances. Thus we do not consider these
results to be an adequate discriminant between processing and reporting explanations of the
observed sell bias. However, another test based on analysts’ reaction to the time series
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properties of earnings is, we believe, more useful. 
Results 3 & 4 show that the underreaction effect for downward momentum is significantly larger
for brokers. In the case of non broker companies the coefficient is 0.70, whereas for broker
companies it is 1.02. The lower panel indicates that this difference is significant. That is, when
the bank acts as a broker to the company, analysts are more likely to believe that earnings will
revert following one period’s poor performance. Whilst it is possible that inside knowledge that
analysts have concerning broker companies makes them more confident in predicting
reversion, this confidence would appear to be severely misplaced. Our preferred explanation
is that analysts find it expedient to ignore clear signs of deteriorating company performance.
This would accord with our evidence in Table 6 concerning the reluctance of brokers to issue
sell recommendations 10. Overall then, we interpret our results as implying the existence of
reporting bias. 
CONCLUSIONS
Using data on UK analysts' forecasts, we estimate the extent to which forecast errors are
systematically determined  by prior year earnings change and the downgrading of analysts’
buy-hold-sell recommendations. We refine Abarbanell and Bernard’s original equation by
recognising divergent signals in the prior year earnings change. A positive value of prior year
earnings change this period can imply either that earnings will continue to rise (momentum) or
that a fall is imminent (reversion). 
Our basic observation is that the Abarbanell and Bernard specification does not indicate how
underreaction is related to investors’ misunderstanding about the time series properties of the
prior year earnings change; such links are discussed in Bernard and Thomas (1990) and
Barberis, et al  (1998). A key property of earnings according to Fama and French (2000) is that
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mean reversion is the more common earnings process in the aggregate economy. Furthermore,
it is well known that analysts (on average) can beat a random walk; that is, they successfully
anticipate the sign of the earnings change. Therefore, models of underreaction should try and
incorporate these stylised facts. This is what we have tried to do in this paper.
What information in the prior year earnings change is then being ignored by analysts? This
matters because it affects the sign of the forecast error. If the information in the prior year
earnings change is that earnings are likely to rise(fall), then if analysts underreact to this, the
forecast is likely to be smaller(larger) than the outcome.  When we estimate our revised model
we find significant underreaction, much larger than in the original Abarbanell and Bernard
equation, particularly when earnings repeatedly decline.
Our reversion/momentum decomposition of the response of forecast errors to prior year
earnings changes is both conceptually and empirically distinct from that reported by Easterwood
and Nutt (1999). Easterwood and Nutt report coefficients decomposed according to the level
of prior years earnings change. In contrast, our model decomposes according to the relation
between the current and prior year’s earnings changes. A nonnested test confirms that our
model is not dominated by that of Easterwood and Nutt. Indeed, there is some weak evidence
that our model dominates previous specifications when estimated on a common dataset.
We also investigate whether sell recommendations are associated with higher forecasts as
reported in Francis & Philbrick (1993). They suggest that this is a reporting bias which arises
when analysts are trying to maintain relations with the company in difficult times. Furthermore,
they find that the sell recommendation effect eliminates the underreaction to the prior year’s
earnings change, indicating the absence of processing bias.  Although our setting is different
in that our analysts prepare both the recommendation and the forecast, we find a similar
recommendation effect. However, unlike Francis & Philbrick, we find the sell recommendation
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effect is distinct from underreaction to the prior year’s earnings change.
In order to distinguish between reporting and processing bias explanations of the sell
recommendation effect, we appeal to a broker variable. This distinguishes between forecasts
issued when the merchant bank has an existing prior commercial relationship with the company,
and those where no such prior relationship exists. Overall, we interpret our results as implying
that the existence of  reporting bias in both types of company. This means that analysts
forecasts are subject to both processing and reporting bias. Modelling the interaction of these
two types of bias awaits further research.
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Note:
This figure represents the trade off analysts face between gaining reputation with investors for
accurate forecasts and maintaining ease of access to management by optimistic forecasts (or
pessimistic forecasts if management value positive earnings surprises.
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FIGURE 2
Underreaction to positive prior year earnings change for earnings momentum and
earnings reversion
Abarbanell & Bernard (1992) model
Et - Ft =  a + b.PYEC + ut (1)
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Figure 4: Plot of Mean EPS for hold to 
sell recommendation
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Table 1: Industry Classification of Sample Firms
Industry Name Number of Sample
Firms
Percentage(%)
Extractive Industries
Oil, Integrated
Oil Exploration & Production
Building & Construction
Building Materials & Merchants
Chemicals
Diversified Industrials
Electronic & Electrical Equipment
Engineering
Engineering, Vehicles
Paper, Packaging  & Printing
Textiles & Apparel
Breweries, Pubs & Restaurants
Alcoholic Beverages
Food Producers
Household Goods
Health Care
Pharmaceuticals
Tobacco
Distributors
Leisure & Hotels
Media
Retailers, Food
Retailers, General
Support services
Transport
Electricity
Gas Distribution
Telecommunications
Water
Banks, Retail
Banks, Merchant
Insurance
Life Assurance
Other Financial
Property
4
3
7
26
21
18
13
17
30
6
9
18
8
8
15
4
9
6
1
17
14
18
12
19
16
12
15
1
6
10
10
5
7
7
11
16
1.0%
0.7%
1.7%
6.2%
5.0%
4.3%
3.1%
4.0%
7.1%
1.4%
2.1%
4.3%
2.0%
2.0%
3.6%
1.0%
2.1%
1.4%
0.2%
4.1%
3.3%
4.3%
2.9%
4.5%
3.8%
2.9%
3.6%
0.2%
1.4%
2.4%
2.4%
1.2%
1.7%
1.7%
2.6%
3.8%
TOTAL 420 100%
Note: The classification of industries is from the analyst’s equity working list for the month of December
1995.
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Table 2: Estimates of Abarbanell & Bernard and Francis & Philbrick models of
underreaction/overreaction to prior year earnings change on UK sample.
The dependent variable is forecast error,  Et - Ft, scaled by share price at the date of the forecast.
Constant PYEC REC Adj.R2
Abarbanell & Bernard model - equation (1)
-0.023** 0.08** 0.01
(0.0005) (0.019)
Francis & Philbrick model - equation (2)
-0.031** 0.08** 0.0064** 0.01
(0.0016) (0.019) (0.0010)
Definitions:
Et = earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
Ft = forecast of earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
REC = analyst recommendation at the time of the forecast. The values taken are: Buy
(2), Hold (1), Sell (0)
PYEC = prior year earnings change at the time of the forecast, scaled by price. 
Notes:
Adj.R2 is the R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Figures in parenthesis are White standard errors.
** (*) indicates significance of the coefficients at the 1% (5%) level using White standard errors.
The sample consists of 38,626 firm - year observations taken from the 1990-96 equity working lists of
a major UK investment bank.
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Table 3: Estimates of underreaction/overreaction to prior year earnings change, with partitioning
based on the current year’s earnings change.
The dependent variable is forecast error,  Et - Ft, scaled by share price at the date of the forecast.
Constant PYECR PYECM PYECM_UP PYECM_DN REC Adj.R
2
Result 1:
Momentum & reversion - equation (4)
-0.023** -0.12** 0.50** 0.15
(0.0005) (0.021) (0.026)
Result 2:
Distinguishing between momentum upwards and momentum downwards - equation (5)
-0.019** -0.12** 0.17** 0.67** 0.17
(0.0007) (0.021) (0.012) (0.036)
Result 3:
Momentum & reversion with recommendation effect
-0.028** -0.13** 0.50** 0.0038** 0.15
(0.0015) (0.021) (0.026) (0.0009)
Result 4:
Distinguishing between momentum upwards and momentum downwards with recommendation effect
-0.022** -0.12** 0.17** 0.67** 0.0026** 0.17
(0.0016) (0.021) (0.012) (0.036) (0.0009)
Definitions:
Et = earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
Ft = forecast of earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
REC = analyst recommendation at the time of the forecast. The values taken are: Buy
(2), Hold (1), Sell (0)
PYEC = prior year earnings change at the time of the forecast, scaled by price. 
CYEC = current year earnings change, scaled by price
PYECR = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings reversion
= PYEC when PYEC & CYEC have the opposite sign; 0 otherwise
PYECM = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings momentum
= PYEC when PYEC & CYEC have the same sign; 0 otherwise
PYECM_UP = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings momentum upwards
= PYECM when PYEC is positive; 0 otherwise
PYECM_DN = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings momentum downwards
= PYECM when PYEC is negative; 0 otherwise
Notes:
Adj.R2 is the R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Figures in parenthesis are White standard errors.
** (*) indicates significance of the coefficients at the 1% (5%) level using White standard errors.
The sample consists of 38,626 firm - year observations taken from the 1990-96 equity working lists of
a major UK investment bank.
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Table 4: The Easterwood and Nutt model
Et - Ft = a0 + a1 Low + a2 High + a3 PYEC + a4 (PYEC. Low) + a5 (PYEC. High) + ut
Constant Constant Constant PYEC PYEC PYEC
Normal Low High Normal Low High Adj.R2
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Easterwood & Nutt original estimates
-1.03 -1.69 -0.48 0.12 0.30 -0.29 0.10
[-9.66] [-11.40] [-3.23] [0.96] [24.98] [-16.59]
Easterwood & Nutt model on our data
Result 1:
-0.015 -0.013 -0.0035 0.14 -0.02 -0.210 0.02
{0.0008} {0.0015} {0.0014} {0.091} {0.091} {0.092}
Result 2:
-0.015** -0.013** -0.0035 0.14** -0.02 -0.210** 0.02
(0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.04) (0.047) (0.061)
Definitions:
Et = earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
Ft = forecast of earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
PYEC = prior year earnings change at the time of the forecast, scaled by price. 
Low = 1, if PYEC is in the lowest quartile of our sample, equal to or below -0.021 
= 0, otherwise
High = 1, if PYEC is in the highest quartile of our sample, equal to or exceeding 0.0125
= 0, otherwise
Notes:
Adj.R2 is the R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Figures in parenthesis () are White standard errors
Figures in curly brackets {} are OLS standard errors
Figures in square brackets [] are Easterwood & Nutt reported OLS t statistics
** (*) indicates significance of the coefficients at the 1% (5%) level using White standard errors.
The sample consists of 38,626 firm - year observations taken from the 1990-96 equity working lists of
a major UK investment bank.
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Table 5: Davidson & MacKinnon J test for nonnested hypotheses
Inserting the predicted values from the Easterwood & Nutt model in to our model
Inserting the predicted values from our model in to the Easterwood & Nutt model
Panel A: Predicted values from our model (P) added to E & N’s model
Et - Ft = a0 + a1 Low +   a2 High +   a3 PYEC +    a4 (PYEC. Low) +  a5 (PYEC. High) + a6 P +  ut
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6  Adj.R2
0.0036** -0.0021 -0.0068** -0.045 0.075 -0.013 0.98** 0.18
(0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.040) (0.045) (0.059) (0.050)
Panel B: Predicted values from E&N’s model (PEN) added to our model
Et - Ft = b0   +  b1 PYECR   +   b2 PYECM_UP   +    b3 PYECM_DN +       b4 PEN       +   ut
b0 b1 b2 b3 b4  Adj.R2
-0.0055 -0.18** 0.20** 0.58** 0.62** 0.18
(0.0052) (0.041) (0.020) (0.054) (0.26)
Definitions:
Et = earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
Ft = forecast of earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
PYEC = prior year earnings change at the time of the forecast, scaled by price. 
Low = 1, if PYEC is in the lowest quartile of our sample, equal to or below -0.021 
= 0, otherwise
High = 1, if PYEC is in the highest quartile of our sample, equal to or exceeding 0.0125
= 0, otherwise
CYEC = current year earnings change, scaled by price
PYECR = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings reversion
= PYEC, when PYEC & CYEC have the opposite sign; 0 otherwise
PYECM = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings momentum
= PYEC when PYEC & CYEC have the same sign; 0 otherwise
PYECM_UP = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings momentum upwards
= PYECM when PYEC is positive; 0 otherwise
PYECM_DN = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings momentum downwards
= PYECM when PYEC is negative; 0 otherwise
Notes:
Adj.R2 is the R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Figures in parenthesis () are White standard errors
** (*) indicates significance of the coefficients, from zero, at the 1% (5%) level using White standard
errors.
The sample consists of 38,626 firm - year observations taken from the 1990-96 equity working lists of
a major UK investment bank.
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Table 6: The % of the sample for each broker relationship and stock
recommendation classification
 Sell Hold Buy Total
The analyst’s firm is not
broker
9.56% 42.40% 28.21% 80.77%
The analyst’s firm is the
broker
0.11% 6.67% 12.45% 19.23%
Total 9.67% 49.07% 41.26% 100%
The Chi-square test for no relationship between stock recommendations made by analysts and the
broker variable rejects the null, with a value of 1274.01
Note: The  sample size is reduced to 20,465 for tests based on  broker status, because for early years
of the data, the broker status is not reported.
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Table 7: Estimates of underreaction/overreaction to prior year earnings change for broker and
non-broker companies, with partitioning based on the current year’s earnings change.
The dependent variable is forecast error,  Et - Ft, scaled by share price at the date of the forecast.
Constant PYECR PYECM_UP PYECM_DN REC Adj.R
2
Result 1: Full sample of 38,626 firm year observations
-0.022** -0.12** 0.17** 0.67** 0.0026** 0.17
(0.0016) (0.021) (0.012) (0.036) (0.0009)
Result 2: Broker and non-broker sample of 20,465 observations
-0.015** -0.12** 0.15** 0.80** 0.0031* 0.20
(0.0027) (0.027) (0.013) (0.056) (0.0015)
Result 3: Non broker sample of 16,529 firm year observations
-0.016** -0.15** 0.14** 0.70** 0.004* 0.17
(0.0030) (0.040) (0.017) (0.071) (0.0016)
Result 4: Broker sample of 3,936 firm year observations
-0.030** -0.07** 0.16** 1.02** 0.0096* 0.30
(0.0085) (0.019) (0.021) (0.056) (0.0045)
Broker and non-broker sample of 20,465 observations
Non-broker coefficients
-0.016** -0.15** 0.14** 0.70** 0.004* 0.21
(0.0030) (0.041) (0.017) (0.071) (0.0016)
coefficient shifts for broker companies
-0.014 0.08 0.02 0.32** 0.005
(0.009) (0.045) (0.027) (0.091) (0.0048)
Definitions:
Et = earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
Ft = forecast of earnings per share, scaled by price at the date of the forecast
REC = analyst recommendation at the time of the forecast. The values taken are: Buy
(2), Hold (1), Sell (0)
PYEC = prior year earnings change at the time of the forecast, scaled by price. 
CYEC = current year earnings change, scaled by price
PYECR = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings reversion
= PYEC when PYEC & CYEC have the opposite sign; 0 otherwise
PYECM = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings momentum
= PYEC when PYEC & CYEC have the same sign; 0 otherwise
PYECM_UP = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings momentum upwards
= PYECM when PYEC is positive; 0 otherwise
PYECM_DN = prior year earnings change for cases of earnings momentum downwards
= PYECM when PYEC is negative; 0 otherwise
Notes:
Adj.R2 is the R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Figures in parenthesis are White standard errors.
** (*) indicates significance of the coefficients at the 1% (5%) level using White standard errors.
The sample consists of 38,626 firm - year observations taken from the 1990-96 equity working lists of
a major UK investment bank. In 3,936 cases the bank acted as broker to the company, in 16,529 cases
the bank did not act as broker, and in 18,161 cases the information was not recorded by the bank.
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1 For each unit of decrease in reputation amongst investors, the relationship with the
company improves at a decreasing rate.
2 apart from the effect of the constant
3 The case of earnings following a random walk seem to be ruled out, since in this model
the earnings change is random and therefore does not contain any information about
future earnings.
4 Specifically, they were told “Remember: Spread out those distributions”, following the
production of  a very tight  distribution of probability  forecasts in the first round.
5 Following E & N we scale by price, while A & B do not and so. Hence our reported
intercept of -0.023 is substantially higher  than A & B’s reported value of -0.44 (see E
& N, pp 1783, footnote 6).   
6 We re-estimated all key regressions from our paper truncating observations outside the
90th and 10th percentile, in the manner suggested by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000,
p24). While the significance of our results is eroded, it is not removed.
7 There is a potential bias in our results. We partition the sample by PYEC (Et-1 - Et-2) and
CYEC (Et  -  Et-1). To the extent that CYEC is correlated with the dependent variable (Et -
Ft), then we are effectively partitioning by PYEC and Et - Ft. Therefore our estimate of
the coefficient on PYECM will be based on data points located in the top-right and
bottom-left in the space, around the origin, of (Et - Ft) on the vertical axis and (Et-1 - Et-2)
on the horizontal axis. Even if the data are scattered randomly within each quadrant, the
coefficient on PYECM will tend to be positive. Similarly, the coefficient on PYECR will be
based on data points located in the top-left and bottom-right quadrants, giving rise to
a negative bias.
However, the correlation between CYEC and the dependent variable (Et - Ft) is likely to be low.
This is because CYEC is the forecast error from a random walk prediction model and Et - Ft is
the analysts forecast error. Analysts are well known to beat a random walk (Brown 1996).
In order to assess the extent of this bias we also ran equation (4) again but distinguishing
between the two types of reversion, PYEC positive/CYEC negative and PYEC negative/CYEC
positive. Both of the coefficients were negative and of a similar size to the coefficient for PYECR
in result 1 in Table 3. Distinguishing between two types of momentum is analysed in Result 2
of Table 3.
8 E&N define normal values of PYEC as embracing the middle two quartiles of the
distribution of PYEC. Low and high values are defined to be the top and bottom
quartiles.
9 See also Maddala (1992) pp515-517.
10 An alternative explanation is that companies which might be the subject of a sell
recommendation are not attracted to the merchant bank  as clients. That is, the sell
recommendation and broker status need to be modelled as endogenous variables.
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